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Abstract: We perform a model analysis to study the origins of limited resilience
in ecological-economic systems. We demonstrate that the resilience properties
of the ecosystem are essentially determined by the management institutions and
consumers’ preferences for ecosystem services. In particular, we show that com-
plementarity of ecosystem services in human well-being and open access of the
ecosystem to proﬁt-maximizing harvesting ﬁrms may lead to limited resilience of
the ecosystem. We conclude that the role of human preferences and manage-
ment institutions is not just to facilitate adaptation to, or transformation of, some
natural dynamics of ecosystems. Rather, human preferences and management
institutions are themselves important determinants of the fundamental dynamic
characteristics of the ecological-economic system, such as limited resilience.
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Natural systems that are used and managed by humans for the ecosystem ser-
vices they provide may exhibit non-trivial dynamics. This makes the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of such systems a huge challenge.
In particular, a system may be characterized by limited resilience (Holling
1973). That is, it exhibits multiple stability domains (“basins of attraction”) that
diﬀer in fundamental system structure and controls as well as in the level and
quality of ecosystem services provided to humans. These stability domains are
separated by thresholds in the system’s state variables. As a result of exogenous
natural disturbances or ill-adapted human interference with the system, the system
may ﬂip from one stability domain into another one with diﬀerent basic functions
and controls (Holling 1973, Levin et al. 1998, Carpenter et al. 2001, Scheﬀer et
al. 2001). Examples encompass a diverse set of ecosystem types that are highly
relevant for economic use, such as boreal forests, semi-arid rangelands, wetlands,
shallow lakes, coral reefs, or high-seas ﬁsheries (Gunderson and Pritchard 2002).
As the system undergoes a regime shift and ﬂips from one basin of attrac-
tion with more desirable ecosystem service provision (from the anthropocentric
point of view based on valuation of ecosystem services) to a basin of attraction
with less desirable ecosystem service provision, humans will assess this change as
a deterioration in ecosystem service provision, or even as a “catastrophic” shift
(Scheﬀer et al. 2001). Such system ﬂips may threaten the intertemporal eﬃciency
of resource management and the intergenerational equity of ecosystem services use
from this system, and may thus impair a sustainable development (Arrow et al.
1995, Perrings 2001, 2006, Derissen et al. 2008, M¨ aler 2008).
Many studies analyzing the role of resilience for the long-term development of
ecological-economic systems explain limits to resilience, i.e. the existence of mul-
tiple basins of attraction in a dynamic system that are separated by thresholds
in the system’s state space, by natural characteristics of the system which exist
prior to any human interference with the system, such as e.g. ecological properties
2of shallow lakes or the interaction between grass and shrub species in semi-arid
rangelands. Human management of the system then has to be adapted to this
natural characteristic, or transform the dynamic characteristics of the natural sys-
tem, so as to achieve sustainability (e.g. Berkes and Folke 1998, Gunderson et al.
2001, Berkes et al. 2002).
In this paper, we want to point out that limits to a system’s resilience, i.e.
the existence of multiple basins of attraction, are not necessarily an originally
ecological characteristic of the system, but they may as well be induced into the
system’s dynamics only by particular forms of human management and economic
use of the system.
For that sake, we present a model of a simple multi-species ecosystem that
may, but does not need to be, harvested for economic purposes, such as proﬁt-
maximization of resource-extracting ﬁrms or optimal satisfaction of resource con-
sumers’ demand. For the clarity of the argument, the model ignores any biological
interactions of the species. In the absence of any economic use or management,
the ecosystem thus exhibits very simple dynamics: there is only one single glob-
ally stable equilibrium and, consequently only one single basin of attraction. In
other words, the system is absolutely resilient to any exogenous disturbance.1 We
show that, in contrast, when species are harvested for economic purposes and are
complementary in human well-being, the system exhibits multiple locally stable
equilibria and, consequently, multiple basins of attraction that are separated by
thresholds in state space. In other words, in the domain of attraction that is
desirable from an anthropocentric point of view (motivated by the valuation of
ecosystem services), the system exhibits only limited resilience and may ﬂip into
another, less desirable, domain of attraction due to some exogenous disturbance.
We also analyze how the resilience properties of the ecological-economic system,
1Of course, there exist natural systems that exhibit non-linear dynamics and, consequently,
limited resilience. The reason why we are starting from a natural ecosystem model with very
simple dynamics is purely analytical: we want to show that limited resilience in the system’s
dynamics may be a consequence of economic use or management.
3which are induced solely by human management of the system, depend on the
management institutions and consumers’ preferences for ecosystem services.
2 Model
Consider the following model, which gives a highly stylized, yet fully encompassing
and general description of dynamic ecological-economic systems. Society consists
of n identical and utility-maximizing individuals who derive utility from the con-
sumption of manufactured goods (y) and two diﬀerent ecosystem services, say ﬁsh
(c) and timber (h). Assuming that all three goods are essential for individual well-
being and that the two ecosystem services are complementary in human well-being,












where α ∈ (0,1) is the representative household’s elasticity of marginal utility of
ecosystem services and 0 ≤ σ < 1 is the elasticity of substitution between the
consumption of ﬁsh and timber. A smaller value of σ thereby implies a higher
degree of complementarity of ﬁsh and timber. In the limit σ → 0, ﬁsh and timber
would be perfect complements and utility would be determined by the relatively
scarcer ecosystem service only.
The dynamics of the stocks of ﬁsh (x) and wood (w) are described by the
following system of diﬀerential equations
˙ x = f(x) − C and (2)
˙ w = g(w) − H , (3)
where the functions f(·) and g(·) describe the intrinsic growth of the stocks of
ﬁsh and wood, and C and H denote the aggregate amounts of ﬁsh and timber
harvested. The diﬀerential Equations (2) and (3) are independent because, by
assumption, the two species are ecologically independent. Although, of course, in
reality there may exist ecological interactions between the two resource species,
4here we assume complete independence for purely analytical reasons: While it is
well known that ecological interactions may give rise to non-trivial resilience prop-
erties, here we want to demonstrate that such dynamic properties of an ecological
system may also result in the absence of any ecological interactions from par-
ticular institutions of resource management or human preferences about resource
consumption.















where ρi denotes the intrinsic growth rate and κi the carrying capacity of the stocks
of ﬁsh (i = x) and wood (i = w), respectively. The speciﬁcation of logistic growth
functions is by no means essential for the results derived below. But using a well-
known functional form of the growth functions f(x) and g(w) helps to clarify the
argument and to highlight the role of preferences and institutions for the dynamics
of the ecological-economic system.
There are mx identical ﬁsh-harvesting ﬁrms and mw identical timber-harvesting
ﬁrms. These numbers are endogenously determined according to market conditions
in these two sectors. Let ex and ew denote the eﬀort, measured in units of labor,
spent by some representative ﬁsh-harvesting-ﬁrm and some representative timber-
harvesting-ﬁrm. The maximum amounts of ﬁsh and timber that can be harvested
from the respective stocks by individual ﬁrms are described by Gordon-Schaefer
production functions
c
prod = νx xex , (6)
h
prod = νw wew , (7)
where νx and νw denote the productivity of harvesting ﬁsh and timber, respectively.
Then, the aggregate amounts of ﬁsh and timber harvested are simply
C = mx c
prod and (8)
H = mw h
prod . (9)
5Assume that each household inelastically supplies one unit of labor, so that
total labor supply of the economy is equal to human population size n, and that
labor markets are perfectly competitive. Households work either in one of the
resource harvesting sectors or in the manufactured-goods sector. Assuming that
labor is the only factor input for the production of manufactured goods, and that
production is through a constant-returns-to-scale technology, i.e. each unit of labor
produces ω > 0 units of output, aggregate output of manufactured goods is
Y = ω (n − mx ex − mw ew) (10)
and the (constant) competitive wage rate is equal to the marginal product of labor,
ω.
3 Analysis
We analyze the resilience properties of the ecological-economic system for diﬀer-
ent scenarios in terms of resource-management institutions and preferences about
ecosystem services. For that sake we employ local and global stability analysis
based on graphical representation of the system’s dynamics in state space.2
3.1 Natural dynamics: unlimited resilience
In the absence of any natural resource use by society, the system’s dynamics is
completely determined by the natural dynamics of the two resources stocks of ﬁsh
and wood, described by Equations (2)–(5) with C = H = 0. Since the dynamics
of the two resource stocks are independent of each other, in the absence of any
harvest both stocks converge to their respective carrying capacity. The isoclines
˙ x = 0 and ˙ w = 0 thus are the straight lines with w = κw and x = κx, respectively.
This dynamics is represented by the state-space diagram shown in Figure 1 for
parameter values ρx = ρw = 0.5 and κx = κw = 1. The green line is the isocline
2All statements could as well be proved analytically, so that it becomes obvious that our qual-
itative statements hold true independent of the parameter values used for graphical illustration.
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Figure 1: Phase diagram for the ecosystem’s natural dynamics without any har-
vest. Dynamics is characterized by ˙ x > 0 (< 0) below (above) the green line, and
˙ w > 0 (< 0) left (right) of the red line. A is an unstable equilibrium, B and C
are locally saddlepoint stable equilibria. D is the only and (almost) globally sta-
ble equilibrium; the corresponding basin of attraction comprises the entire state
space with the exception of points A, B and C. Parameter values: ρx = ρw = 0.5,
κx = κw = 1.
for ˙ x = 0, the red line is the isocline for ˙ w = 0. Below (above) the ˙ x = 0-
isocline the dynamics is characterized by ˙ x > 0 (< 0). Likewise, left (right) of the
˙ w = 0-isocline the dynamics is characterized by ˙ w > 0 (< 0). In each segment of
state space, the green and red arrows indicate this direction of dynamics. At the
intersection of the isoclines (point D: x = 1, w = 1), one has ˙ x = ˙ w = 0 and from
the arrows it becomes obvious that this is a stable equilibrium.
Other than D, the system has three more equilibria: A (x = w = 0),B (x = 1,
w = 0) and C (x = 0, w = 1). From the state-space representation (Figure 1) it is
obvious that A is an unstable equilibrium, while B and C are locally saddlepoint
7stable equilibria. From the point of view of social desirability, equilibrium D is
clearly superior to equilibria A, B and C because the latter are characterized by
non-existence of one (C) or the other (B) or both (A) of the resource species and
the corresponding ecosystem service so that utility (Equation 1) is zero and, thus,
minimal.
In terms of stability, D is the only stable equilibrium of the system. The corre-
sponding stability domain (“basin of attraction”) comprises the entire state space
with the exception of points A, B and C. From any system state in that domain
will the system automatically converge towards equilibrium D. So, equilibrium D
is (almost) globally stable – where the “almost” refers to the exception of three
single system states (A, B, C) none of which is stable.3 In terms of resilience, the
natural system is therefore characterized by (almost) unlimited resilience.
3.2 Institutions: Proﬁt-maximizing harvesting under open
access to ecosystems signiﬁcantly weakens resilience
We demonstrate that institutions of resource management can signiﬁcantly alter
the resilience properties of an ecosystem by giving an example of an institution that
signiﬁcantly weakens resilience of the ecosystem. Suppose that proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms can harvest the resource species from their natural stocks under open-access
to ecosystems, and sell these ecosystem services as market products to consumers.
Taking manufactured goods as the numeraire, the representative household’s
utility maximization problem is
max
y,c,h
u(y,c,h) subject to ω = y + px c + pw h , (11)
where px and pw are the market prices of ﬁsh and timber, respectively. With utility
3The exceptions to the global stability domain form a set of Lebegue measure zero.















Proﬁts of representative ﬁrms harvesting ﬁsh and timber are given by
πx = px c
prod − ω ex = (px νx x − ω) ex and (14)
πw = pw h
prod − ω ew = (pw νw w − ω) ew , (15)
where production functions (6) and (7) have been employed in the second equality.
In open-access equilibrium, which is characterized by zero proﬁts, i.e. πx = 0 and
πw = 0 for all ﬁrms, we thus have the following relationships between equilibrium











Inserting these expressions into demand functions (12) and (13), we obtain open-












σ−1 + (νw w)
σ−1 . (19)
General market equilibrium, when aggregate supply equals aggregate demand
on the markets for both ecosystem services, is characterized by the conditions
C = mx c
prod = nc(x,w) and (20)
H = mw h
prod = nh(x,w) . (21)
Inserting these market-clearing-conditions into Equations (2) and (3), the dynam-
ics of the ecological-economic system in a general market equilibrium where proﬁt-
maximizing harvesting ﬁrms have open access to ecosystems is described by the
9following system of coupled diﬀerential equations:
˙ x = f(x) − nc(x,w) and (22)
˙ w = g(w) − nh(x,w) . (23)
This dynamics is represented by the state-space diagram shown in Figure 2 for
parameter values ρx = ρw = 0.5, κx = κw = 1, νx = νw = 1, α = 0.6, σ = 0.4 and
n = 1. Again, the green line is the isocline for ˙ x = 0, the red line is the isocline for
saddlepaths
˙ x = 0



























Figure 2: Phase diagram for the ecosystem’s dynamics under open access and
proﬁt-maximizing harvesting. Dynamics is characterized by ˙ x > 0 (< 0) left
(right) of the green line, and ˙ w > 0 (< 0) below (above) the red line. A is an
unstable equilibrium; E and F are locally saddlepoint stable equilibria; B, C and
D are locally stable equilibria; the corresponding basins of attraction are the area
northeast of the upper saddlepath (for B), the upper saddlepath (for F), the area
in between the two saddlepaths (for D), the lower saddlepath (for E), and the
area southwest of the lower saddlepath (for C). Parameter values: ρx = ρw = 0.5,
κx = κw = 1, νx = νw = 1, α = 0.6, σ = 0.4, n = 1.
10˙ w = 0. Left (right) of the ˙ x = 0-isocline the dynamics is characterized by ˙ x > 0
(< 0). Likewise, below (above) the ˙ w = 0-isocline the dynamics is characterized
by ˙ w > 0 (< 0). In each segment of state space, the green and red arrows indicate
this direction of dynamics.
Compared to the scenario without human resource use (cf. Figure 1), the
stability properties of the ecosystem are now fundamentally altered. While A
(x = w = 0) is still an unstable equilibrium, B (x = 1, w = 0) and C (x = 0,
w = 1) are now locally stable equilibria. D is still a stable equilibrium, but it is now
only locally stable. In addition, there are two new equilibria, E and F, which are lo-
cally saddlepoint stable. The stability domains (“basins of attraction”) associated
with the stable equilibria are as follows: for the saddlepoint stable equilibrium E it
is the saddlepath associated with E; for the saddlepoint stable equilibrium F it is
the saddlepath associated with F; for the locally stable equilibrium B it is the area
northeast of the saddlepath associated with F; for the locally stable equilibrium
C it is the area southwest of the saddlepath associated with E; and for the locally
stable equilibrium D it is the area in between the two saddlepaths.
It is obvious that the particular resource management institution considered
here as an example – open access to ecosystems of proﬁt-maximizing harvesting
ﬁrms – has fundamentally altered the resilience properties of the ecosystem. While
in the absence of human resource use there exists only one (almost) globally stable
equilibrium with (almost) unlimited resilience, the ecosystem has three locally
stable equilibria under open access to ecosystems of proﬁt-maximizing harvesting
ﬁrms. Each of those has an associated stability domain (“basin of attraction”)
which comprises only a limited part of the state space, so that the system may ﬂip
from one basin of attraction to another one as a result of exogenous disturbance.
In particular, the equilibrium D (with both resource species in existence) has now
only limited resilience, and the system may be disturbed in a way that it ﬂips into
another basin of attraction with another locally stable equilibrium characterized
by extinction of one or the other species.
113.3 Insitutions: Optimal harvesting by a sole owner or reg-
ulator increases resilience
As we have demonstrated in the previous section, proﬁt-maximizing harvesting un-
der open access to ecosystems weakens resilience of the ecological-economic system
compared to the case without harvesting. But also when harvesting takes place,
resilience of the system may be increased by a change in the institutional setting.
In order to illustrate this point, we consider the example of optimal resource use,
which may be implemented through the institutional setting that a sole owner or
regulator determines and implements the optimal harvesting of ﬁsh and timber.4
The optimization problem is to choose total harvest of ﬁsh (C) and timber


















˙ x = f(x) − C (26)
˙ w = g(w) − H . (27)
Here, we assume a positive discount rate δ > 0. This optimization problem is
























+ µx [f(x) − C] + µw [g(w) − H] , (28)
where λ is the shadow price of the manufactured good, µx is the shadow price of
the ﬁsh stock and µw is the shadow price of the stock of wood. The ﬁrst-order
4For simplicity, we normalize population to unity in this section following, i.e. we set n = 1.
12conditions for the optimization problem (24) are as follows
1 − α
y

























νx x2 = [δ − f
0(x)] µx − ˙ µx (32)
λ
ω H
νw w2 = [δ − g
0(w)] µw − ˙ µw . (33)
The easiest way to gain insights into the optimal dynamics of the ecological-
economic system is to consider the optimal steady state. The steady-state values
for the stocks of ﬁsh and wood and the harvest of ﬁsh and timber are characterized
by the following four conditions
C = f(x) (34)
H = g(w) (35)
ω C



































For the parameter values used in the example of the previous section (see caption
of Figure 2) and for a reasonably low discount rate, the optimal steady state is
unique.. Hence, under optimal regulation, the dynamics are characterized by an
(almost) globally stable steady state. Figure 3 shows how the optimal steady-state
level of the stock of ﬁsh varies with the discount rate.
3.4 Preferences: Substitutability among ecosystem services
in consumption increases resilience
Besides the institutional setting, human preferences about ecosystem services and
manufactured goods are a signiﬁcant determinant of an ecosystem’s resilience prop-






































Figure 3: Optimal steady state level of the stock of ﬁsh for varying discount rate.
The steady state is unique for the whole range of discount rates. Parameter values:
ρx = ρw = 0.5, κx = κw = 1, νx = νw = 1, α = 0.6, σ = 0.4, n = 1. Due to
the identical parameter values assumed in this example, the steady state stock of
wood is equal to the steady state stock of ﬁsh.
erties. This is demonstrated here by illustrating for the institutional setting con-
sidered in the previous section – open access to ecosystems of proﬁt-maximizing
harvesting ﬁrms – how a change in the elasticity of substitution between the con-
sumption of ﬁsh and timber aﬀects the stability properties of the ecosystem.
The analysis in the previous subsection was carried out for an elasticity of
substitution between the consumption of ﬁsh and timber of σ = 0.4, which reﬂects
a mild complementarity. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the stability properties of
the ecosystem when – everything else being equal – the elasticity of substitution
changes to σ = 0.95 (low complementarity) and σ = 0.05 (high complementarity),
respectively.
From Figure 4 it is apparent that even for open access and proﬁt-maximizing
14saddlepaths
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Figure 4: Phase diagram for the ecosystem’s dynamics under open access and
proﬁt-maximizing harvesting. Dynamics is characterized by ˙ x > 0 (< 0) below
(above) the green line, and ˙ w > 0 (< 0) left (right) of the red line. A is an
unstable equilibrium, B and C are locally saddlepoint stable equilibria. D is the
only and (almost) globally stable equilibrium; the corresponding basin of attraction
comprises the entire state space with the exception of points A, B and C. Parameter
values: ρx = ρw = 0.5, κx = κw = 1, νx = νw = 1, α = 0.6, σ = 0.95, n = 1.
resource harvesting, with low complementarity between ecosystem services in con-
sumption the resilience of the system is relatively high. The stability properties
of the system are basically the same as in the natural state, i.e. without human
resource management, while the location of the stable equilibrium D in state space
has shifted quite a bit due to resource harvesting (cf. Figure 1).
With increasing complementarity between the two ecosystem services in con-
sumption, i.e. decreasing value of σ, the resilience of this equilibrium reduces (cf.
Figure 2 and the discussion in the previous section). At a certain threshold value
of σ (σ = 1/3 for the parameter values used to compute the ﬁgures) the locally
15stable equilibrium D in Figures 1, 2 and 4 looses its stability and turns into an only
saddlepoint-stable equilibrium (Figure 5). The stability domain (“basin of attrac-
saddlepaths
˙ x = 0

























Figure 5: Phase diagram for the ecosystem’s dynamics under open access and
proﬁt-maximizing harvesting. Dynamics is characterized by ˙ x > 0 (< 0) left (right)
of the green line, and ˙ w > 0 (< 0) below (above) the red line. A is an unstable
equilibrium; B, C and D are locally saddlepoint-stable equilibria; the stability
domain for each of those equilibria is just a one-dimensional line. Parameter
values: ρx = ρw = 0.5, κx = κw = 1, νx = νw = 1, α = 0.6, σ = 0.05, n = 1.
tion”) for this equilibrium is just a one-dimensional line. This means, its resilience
is extremely reduced and the system is very brittle and sensitive to exogenous
disturbance.
The general insight from the analysis in this section is that resilience of the
interior equilibrium with both resource species in existence (D) tends to decrease
with increasing complementarity, i.e. decreasing elasticity of substitution, between
the two ecosystem services in human well-being. In other words, while comple-
mentarity of ecosystem services in human well-being destabilizes an ecosystem,
16substitutability of ecosystem services in human well-being tends to make the nat-
ural resource systems that provide these services more resilient.
4 Conclusion
Our analysis has demonstrated that the role of human preferences and manage-
ment institutions is not just to facilitate adaptation to, or transformation of, some
natural dynamics of ecosystems, but that they are themselves important deter-
minants of the dynamic characteristics of the ecological-economic system, such as
limited resilience.
In particular, we have shown that complementarity of ecosystem services in
human well-being signiﬁcantly reduces the resilience of ecosystems when proﬁt-
maximizing harvesting ﬁrms have open access to ecosystems. This is due to the
following de-stabilizing eﬀect: out of two complementary ecosystem services, the
scarcer one is limiting the beneﬁts from ecosystem service use. Hence, under an
institutional setting of open access, this ecosystem service is the one to which
harvest is directed primarily. The increased harvesting eﬀort, in turn, reduces the
abundance of that resource even further, thus leading to self-re-enforcing dynamics.
Put the other way round, this means that substitutability of ecosystem services
in consumption tends to make the ecosystems that provide these services more
resilient.
In the joint endeavor of natural and social scientists as well as practitioners of
resource management to understand and manage ecological-economic systems for
sustainability, our results call for truly interdisciplinary and integrated analysis of
such systems and their management.
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